

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 227 522

CS 504 130

AUTHOR Ivie, Robert L.
TITLE Speaking "Common Sense" about the Soviet Threat:
Reagan's Rhetorical Stance.
PUB DATE Feb 83
NOTE 20p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Western Speech Communication Association
(Albuquerque, NM, February 19-22, 1983).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Viewpoints (120)
-- Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Communication Research; Discourse Analysis; Foreign
Countries; *Foreign Policy; *Metaphors; *Persuasive
Discourse; *Political Influences; Political Issues;
Presidents; *Rhetorical Criticism
IDENTIFIERS *Political Rhetoric; *Reagan (Ronald); USSR

ABSTRACT

Although for the 15 years preceding his election as President of the United States Ronald Reagan muted his anti-Soviet rhetoric in order to achieve political power, since his election he has returned to anti-Sovietism in an effort to redirect American foreign policy against the Soviets. At the same time, however, he employs a rhetorical strategy that stresses the essential rationality, the "common sense," of his approach. Specifically, his most important image, one of Soviet savagery, extends to three issues: the extent of the Soviet threat, America's proper response, and the possibility of peace in a nuclear world. In addition to explicit use of this metaphor, Reagan regularly reintroduces it through a number of vehicles that place the Soviets in eight general categories as: (1) inanimate and physical, (2) animals, (3) primitives, (4) machines, (5) criminals, (6) mentally disturbed, (7) fanatics and ideologues, and (8) satanic and profane. Reagan presents these images not as metaphor, but as literal truth. As with other metaphors, this image is a way of seeing the facts that also shapes the facts that are seen. Replacing complexity with simplicity, the metaphor rejects as irrelevant or unimportant information that does not fit within its scheme. Finally, Reagan's relaxed persona reinforces the idea that the imagery of savagery and its corollaries form the only sensible perspective on the Soviet Union. (JL)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

ED227522

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)

X This document has been reproduced as
received from the person or organization
originating it.
Minor changes have been made to improve
reproduction quality.

- Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

Speaking "Common Sense" About the Soviet Threat:
Reagan's Rhetorical Stance

By

Robert L. Ivie
Department of Communications
Washington State University
Pullman, Washington 99164

Rhetoric and Public Address Interest Group
Western Speech Communication Association
54th Annual Convention
Albuquerque, New Mexico
February 20, 1983

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS
MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Robert L. Ivie

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

SS84/30

Speaking "Common Sense" About the Soviet Threat:
Reagan's Rhetorical Stance

Abstract

This paper examines the symbolic resources drawn upon by Ronald Reagan to characterize his anti-Soviet policies and increased military expenditures as common-sense adaptations to a real threat. The pattern of his rhetorical efforts is to establish a basic context of assumptions about Soviet conduct, using the metaphor of savagery and a set of decivilizing vehicles as primary resources. The resulting image is "literalized" through an interplay of metaphor and facts in which the trope acts like a powerful magnet that attracts supportive evidence and repels inconsistent data. A presidential persona incarnates the people's voice and speaks the community's mind to lend a further note of rationality to the heroic call for a strong America.

One of the persistent objectives of Ronald Reagan's presidential rhetoric has been to rally the nation around his image of the Soviet threat. Such, however, has not always been the case with "the great communicator" since he emerged in 1964 as a prominent spokesman for the Republican cause. Within six months of his nationally-televised "island of freedom" speech on behalf of Barry Goldwater's campaign for the presidency, Reagan had already compromised his anti-Soviet rhetoric so that he might increase his appeal to the general public and thereby improve his chances in California's upcoming gubernatorial race. In a series of appearances around the country designed to solidify the still undeclared candidate's political base and to enhance his image as an intelligent and reasonable leader, the actor-turned-politician carefully avoided statements that might appeal strictly to conservative voters. Whenever speaking before television cameras or for publication, Kurt Ritter notes, Reagan's campaign strategy precluded him from stressing the Communist menace. It was only in unpublished talks to conservative groups that Reagan dwelled upon the dangers of Communism and warned of the life and death struggle that would determine whether America's freedom and the vision of its forefathers could endure.¹

Some, notably political scientist Lance Bennett, will immediately recognize Reagan's rhetorical ebb and flow as a classic strategy for adapting to the realities of election campaigns. Candidates must remain sufficiently orthodox and ambiguous on the issues to earn the support of a majority among the multitude of competing interest groups. According to Bennett's rule of selectivity, successful candidates generally reserve their explicit statements of opinion on potentially volatile questions for presentation to homogenous

and sympathetic audiences under circumstances that exclude the news media.²

What is especially interesting about the first two years of Reagan's presidency, however, is that he has chosen to emphasize the very same issue that he deemphasized in 1965 in order to protect an early bid for political office. Now he is attempting to present as reasonable an attitude toward the Soviet Union that he feared over fifteen years ago might undermine his image as an intelligent and moderate spokesman for middle America. Clearly, the campaign for public opinion did not suddenly cease once the election was won, for there are always other elections just over the horizon and many uses to be made of public opinion in the meantime. Nor can it be said that Reagan's strident anti-Communism is beyond controversy or above criticism in the 1980s. Even as the President's personal popularity remains fairly high, recent measurements of public opinion by George Gallup indicate that the majority of Americans desire improved relations with the Soviet Union, not more confrontations.³ Reagan has chosen, in other words, to take a clear and distinct stand on an issue that almost inevitably threatens to shatter the fragile consensus of opinion he has cultivated so carefully for so long and relied upon so heavily to establish his present base of political power.

Yet political power amounts to more than an end in itself. Its value is determined as well by the goals it can be made to serve. In Ronald Reagan's case, the ends of power include the redirection of American foreign policy and augmentation of military might to preserve the nation from eventual defeat by its Soviet adversary.⁴ Thus the President's anti-Soviet rhetoric, now primarily in the service of his foreign policy goals, plays an essentially different role vis-à-vis public opinion than in 1965. Whereas his first priority previously was to secure a base of political power, his present concern is with maintaining a maximum degree of support for the policies of

his new administration. Rather than backing away from anti-Soviet rhetoric when it threatens his command over public opinion, Reagan as President advances with the intent of making his case against America's number one enemy sound as reasonable as possible so that his policies may ultimately prevail.

From the point of view of his critics, however--to borrow a phrase from Murray Edelman--Reagan's words are succeeding even as his policies fail. That is, a flawed policy is being perceived as successful because of how it is symbolized.⁵ Whichever view one takes, that of the President or his critics, it is most instructive to examine the symbolic resources drawn upon by Reagan to reassure Americans and their allies of the essential rationality of his stance against the Russians. Specifically, I will discuss in this paper the President's strategy of speaking "common sense" about the Soviet threat as he attempts to counter apprehensions that his foreign policy is indeed problematic.

At the heart of Reagan's rhetorical strategy is the metaphor of Soviet savagery, which establishes the interpretive set, or context of assumptions, that the remainder of his logic largely depends upon for its coherence. The metaphor extends to three issues in Reagan's discussion of foreign affairs: (1) What is the character of the Soviet threat? (2) What is America's proper response? and (3) Can peace be achieved in a nuclear world?

To these questions, the President has responded, first, that the United States faces a barbarous enemy who has been single-mindedly pouring every resource into "the making of instruments of destruction", while the intended victim has been naïvely disarming in pursuit of an illusive detente.⁶ Consequently, a "window of vulnerability" has opened which jeopardizes the civilized world's peace and freedom.⁷ That is the threat. Second, America's proper response is to prepare itself to deal with the barbarian from

a position of strength. As Reagan has put it, the Soviets "respect only strength and resolve in their dealings with other nations."⁸ Because the Russian brute understands and responds to only raw force, the United States must rebuild its conventional and nuclear arsenals, thus insuring a margin of safety at least temporarily.

Yet, on the third matter, even President Reagan has admitted that peace in a nuclear world is precarious at best. If one's last defense is the credible threat of nuclear retaliation, then one must be prepared to risk human extinction or abandon the defense of civilization. As Reagan told Parliament on June 8, 1982:

We see around us today the marks of our terrible dilemma--predictions of doomsday, anti-nuclear demonstrations, an arms race in which the West must, for its own protection, be an unwilling participant. At the same time we see totalitarian forces in the world who seek subversion and conflict around the globe to further their barbarous assault on the human spirit. What, then, is our course? Must civilization perish in a hail of fiery atoms? Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?⁹

It is the President's response to this question of how to prevent war permanently without capitulating to Communism that most clearly reveals his dependence on the metaphor of savagery, for his answer is to secure the reign of peace by civilizing the barbarian.

In the short run, the Russian bear can be held at bay by the strength of Western arms alone. But the grand vision calls for more than simply containing the enemy. Civilization actually will "transcend" Communism and thereby "preserve freedom as well as peace" by establishing the "conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries," including the

U.S.S.R. Thus Reagan has called upon his countrymen and their allies to follow him on "a crusade for freedom." As he told the Bundestag, June 9, 1982, "We must build a cathedral of peace, where nations are safe from war and where people need not fear for their liberties."¹⁰

Although the metaphor of savagery is essential to Reagan's anti-Soviet logic, he does not depend solely nor even primarily on its most blatant usage. Instead, he regularly reintroduces the image somewhat more subtly through a number of decivilizing vehicles, which range from the inanimate and physical forces of nature to the satanic and profane acts of men. In this manner, he triggers an archetypal metaphor and its common-sense perspective without appearing overly redundant or calling so much attention to its limitations as the explanation of the Kremlin's conduct.¹¹ Eight categories of these decivilizing vehicles are readily illustrated in the President's foreign policy discourse. For instance:

I. The Soviets as Inanimate and Physical

Reagan told the people of West Berlin that theirs was "a meeting place of light and shadow, tyranny and freedom. To be here is truly to stand on freedom's edge and in the shadow of a wall that has come to symbolize all that is darkest in the world today, to sense how shining and priceless--and how much in need of constant vigilance and protection our legacy of liberty is."¹² At the United Nations, he referred to the Berlin Wall as "a grim, gray monument to repression."¹³ Before the Bundestag, he spoke of "the gale of intimidation that blows from the east."¹⁴ And in the State of the Union address of January 26, 1982, the President warned that we must not "fall under the shadow of Soviet power."¹⁵

II. The Soviets as Animals

- The Russians, Reagan told Parliament, "muzzle the self-expression" of their people.¹⁶

III. The Soviets as Primitives

In their "barbarous assault on the human spirit," the Soviets have resorted to "clubs against the Polish people."¹⁷ But the West will not be "bullied into fatalism."¹⁸

IV. The Soviets as Machines

They are "instruments of destruction" and efficient "machines of war."¹⁹

V. The Soviets as Criminals

They resort to "cruel extremes" and have erected a "murderous barrier."²⁰ They are prepared "to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat."²¹

VI. The Soviets as Mentally Disturbed

They are, as Reagan told the commencement audience at Eureka College, "a world power of such deep fears, hostilities, and external ambitions."²²

VII. The Soviets as Fanatics and Ideologues

It is "that religion of theirs, which is Marxist-Leninism" that makes them so immune to practical reason."²³

VIII. The Soviets as Satanic and Profane

In the President's words, "the forces of good" must ultimately rally if they are to "triumph over evil." The "great civilized ideas" of "individual liberty, representative government, and the rule of law under God" are "menaced" by an "evil neighbor." Communism, like fascism, has glorified "the arbitrary power of the state" while denying "the existence of God" and "those God-given liberties that are

the inalienable right of each person on this planet." Theirs is a "totalitarian evil," an "ideology . . . without God."²⁴

The recurrence of the savagery metaphor through these several decivilizing vehicles is Reagan's principal means of keeping before the public a perspective from which to see the facts of Soviet misconduct. Political reality, in this case as in all others, is a function of metaphor, which itself is beyond verification by direct observation. Such images "involve the creation rather than the discovery of likeness."²⁵ They provide starting points for constructing political realities which soon become self-contained interpretations in the guise of independently verified truths and common-sense axioms. As Kenneth Burke observes, "From what we want to arrive at, we derive our ways of getting there, although the conventions of logical exposition usually present things the other way round."²⁶ The vehicle of savagery is more than just compared to the tenor of Soviet conduct in Reagan's scheme of interpretation. Both are treated as one and the same, a merger that not only foreshadows the President's conclusion but also plays an essential role in the presentation of his rhetorical proofs of those conclusions.

Reagan's proofs are important to his strategy of speaking common sense about the Soviet threat because the image of savagery must not appear as a metaphor or mere figure of speech. It must stand as a literal statement about the Kremlin's hostile intentions, which entails empirical confirmation--just what the President's rhetorical proofs are meant to suggest.²⁷ Yet, the literalization of the image requires use of the trope itself to interpret the signs of its own verification. Without the metaphor of savagery, Reagan's "evidence" is subject to recasting in some mold other than Russian hostility.

The President's use of historical examples at the United Nations on June 17, 1982 illustrates this interplay of metaphor and evidence. First, he

introduced the metaphor to characterize the record of Soviet conduct following the war against Nazi Germany. In his words, "Since World War II, the record of tyranny has included Soviet violation of the Yalta agreements leading to domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin Wall--a grim, gray monument to repression that I visited just a week ago. It includes the takeovers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan; and the ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland."²⁸ Next, by way of contrast, Reagan informed his audience that America has been "the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals" since the end of World War II. As he told the story:

In 1946, . . . the United States submitted a proposal for control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy by an international authority. The Soviets rejected this plan. In 1955, President Eisenhower made his "Open Skies" proposal The Soviets rejected this plan. In 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons In the early 1970s, again at United States urging, agreements were reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. providing for ceilings on some categories of weapons. They could have been more meaningful if Soviet actions had shown restraint and commitment to stability at lower levels of force. . . . In reality [there followed] an unprecedented buildup of military weapons and the flaring of aggression and use of force in almost every region of the world. . . . The task at hand is to assure civilized behavior among nations²⁹

These examples at first glance may seem to provide independent empirical grounds for inferring the objective reality of Soviet savagery. Note, though, that as Reagan recounts post-World War II events, his narrative selectively

contrasts America's peace initiatives, positive motives and the like with the Kremlin's abrupt rejections, broken agreements, and unexplained aggressions. An audience caught up in Reagan's dramatic experiences frustration over the Soviet Union's unwillingness to go along with what seems obviously the right thing to do. Only the ubiquitous metaphor of savagery explains such evil conduct. That is, only a barbarian nation could fail to identify with the highest ideals of civilization--eternal peace and liberty for humankind. As Turbayne would say, the metaphor we adopt determines "our attitude toward the facts."³⁰ Thus the facts prove Reagan's point because his metaphor directs attention away from any other point of view. His argument makes common sense because there is no other sense to be made of the evidence he presents, unless of course an alternative metaphor comes to mind. But that is unlikely, for as Edelman explains, "metaphors permit men to live in a world in which the causes are simple and neat and the remedies are apparent." To cope with "a complicated empirical world" we "hold to a relatively few, simple, archetypal myths, of which the conspiratorial enemy" is a central one.³¹ In short, to paraphrase Ernest Bormann and James E. Combs among others, the President creates political reality with a fantasy that cuts through the ambiguity and confusion, even inherent absurdity, of international affairs.³²

Reagan's savagery metaphor acts like a powerful magnet that attracts supportive evidence and repels inconsistent data. For instance, his televised address to the nation on November 22, 1982 included electronically animated graphics which contrasted U.S. blue with much larger representations of Soviet red in selected areas of defense spending and nuclear weaponry, thus "proving" the enemy's military superiority and aggressive design.³³ Predictably, critics quickly pointed to other statistics which "demonstrated" certain U.S. strengths and America's overall nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R. Some even

argued that production of the MX missile, labelled the "peacekeeper" by Reagan, would give the U.S. a "first strike" capability that would destabilize the nuclear balance and escalate the arms race.³⁴ The President's response was to ignore the evidence presented by opponents of the military build up, but to castigate the news media for confusing the issue by overlooking the facts of Soviet belligerence presented in the speech of November 22. He complained, in his first news conference of 1983, that the "constant drumbeat" of the media (here even the media are savages) has caused the public unnecessary concern over increases in military spending. "On the chart," he said in apparent reference to two of the charts featured in his televised speech, "you will find that in constant dollars the [U.S.] defense budget is just about the same as it's been all the way back to 1962. You will also find that as a percentage of gross national product it is smaller than it was in the . . . Eisenhower and Kennedy years."³⁵ Yet, as Reagan emphasized in November, Soviet spending during this period of U.S. moderation "has gone up and up and up," leaving the enemy with a "decided advantage" in "virtually every measure of military power."³⁶ In short, that which is consistent with the essential truth of Russian barbarism is what should be emphasized and remembered. All else is irrelevant, misleading, and unworthy of consideration by "realists."

~~The President's~~ persona is still another resource for symbolizing the common-sense logic behind his defense spending initiatives. The speech of November 22 is a good example of that easy, unhurried, calm style of delivery with which he looks directly into the audiences' collective eye to tell them in the most candid terms that one-sided arms reductions invite Soviet aggression. As Ritter points out, Reagan used similar tactics in 1965 to come across as "a sensible, reasonable guy." He made every effort to appear as

though he was speaking spontaneously rather than from a manuscript, he drew upon "commonplace jokes," he quoted from respected scholars and literary figures, and he presented several facts--including statistics which were interspersed with "unrelated and unsupported generalizations."³⁷ In so many ways, Reagan as President continues to cultivate the ethos of good sense and goodwill that the public desires of its leaders. Commonplaces and everyday analogies infuse his enthymemes with rhetorical force by identifying the speaker with the audience's beliefs and values. "And, yes, it is sadly ironic," he tells the nation, "that in these modern times it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not." If we don't modernize our antique weapons, the old age of which already has claimed too many lives among our young men and women in uniform, then the Soviets "have little incentive to negotiate with us. . . . They would know we were bluffing without a good hand because they know what cards we hold--just as we know what is in their hand." Above all else, "Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. . . . We must reassure them . . . that their parents . . . are seeking . . . to keep them safe" If seeing is believing, in the best of midwestern traditions Reagan shows Americans the truth of the matter with the aid of his color-coded charts. His placid tones invite everyone to submit to reality, even if the truth is somewhat unpleasant. His sincere gaze is directed to his notes just briefly to reassure viewers of his accuracy in quoting "the philosopher Spinoza," who said, "Peace is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice."³⁸ These are the qualities a leader shares with his people to symbolize a community of thought and bolster their confidence in staying the course.

Indeed, the success of the rhetorical Reagan depends largely on his appeal to common-sense principles drawn from images of Soviet savagery that

have been literalized by the facts and certified by an incarnation of the people's voice. It may well be "there is a heroic aura surrounding Reagan's rhetoric," as Walter Fisher argues, which "appeals to ego, to one's conviction that one can face any hazard or hardship and prevail." Fisher points out that such optimism is founded on displays of honesty, sincerity, innocence, and certainty as well as appeals to a compelling myth.³⁹ I am content to add that those who would supplant the heroic view of the Soviet menace cannot easily succeed without some alternative to the President's metaphor. Their task is much larger than simply rejecting the savagery motif as "intellectual primitivism and naivete unpardonable in a great government."⁴⁰ They must also search out a myth as compelling as the one Reagan stretches into a definition of political reality. In his hands, an archetype has been carefully crafted to fulfill its essential function of making common sense where confusion might otherwise prevail within the polity.

Footnotes

¹Kurt W. Ritter, "Ronald Reagan and 'The Speech': The Rhetoric of Public Relations Politics," Western Speech, 32 (Winter 1968), 54.

²W. Lance Bennett, "The Ritualistic and Pragmatic Bases of Political Campaign Discourse," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 63 (1977), 229-231.

³The results of the poll are discussed by Joseph C. Harsch, "USA vs. USSR in 1983," Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 1983, p. 22. The poll, taken a week after Yuri Andropov assumed power in mid-November of 1982, asked respondents if they "favor or oppose the U.S. going further than it has so far in trying to develop better relations with the Soviet Union." By a margin of more than two to one, the sample favored better relations, a clear reminder that American public opinion must be cultivated by Reagan and others who support his strident anti-Soviet stance.

⁴Reagan's view of the Soviet threat was responsible in large measure for his conversion from liberal Democrat to conservative Republican, and there has been little if any change in his attitude since that time. Although he moderated some of "the harsher rhetoric" of his past while running for the presidency in 1980, as Henry A. Plotkin observes, Reagan presented "a foreign policy not unlike the cold-war perspective of the 1950s." Henry A. Plotkin, "issues in the Presidential Campaign," in The Election of 1980: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Marlene Michels Pomper (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 58. Also, Nancy Lammers, ed., President Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981), pp. 21-22; and Ross K. Baker, "Outlook for the Reagan Administration," in The Election of 1980, p. 143.

⁵The perspective, not the specific criticism of Reagan's policies, is presented in Murray Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

⁶Ronald Reagan, "Address of the President to Members of Both Houses of Parliament," White House Press Release (London, England), June 8, 1982, p. 4. Hereafter, Reagan to Parliament.

⁷Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 5, 1981, p. 1074. Hereafter, Weekly Compilation.

⁸"State of the Union Address, January 26, 1982," Weekly Compilation, February 1, 1982, p. 82. Hereafter, State of the Union 1982.

⁹Reagan to Parliament, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰"Commencement Address at University of Notre Dame, May 17, 1981," Weekly Compilation, May 25, 1981, p. 532. Hereafter, Reagan at Notre Dame. Reagan to Parliament, pp. 4, 8. "Commencement Address at Eureka College," Weekly Compilation, May 17, 1982, p. 600. Hereafter, Reagan at Eureka College. Reagan to Parliament, p. 10. "Address by the President to the Bundestag," White House Press Release (Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany), June 9, 1982, p. 9. Hereafter, Reagan to Bundestag.

¹¹For a discussion of the rhetorical significance of archetypal metaphors, see Michael Osborn, "Archetypal Metaphor in Rhetoric: The Light-Dark Family," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 53 (1967), 115-126.

¹²"Address by the President to the People of Berlin," White House Press Release (West Berlin), June 11, 1982, p. 1. Hereafter, Reagan to West Berlin.

¹³"Address of the President to the United Nations," White House Press Release (New York, New York), June 17, 1982, p. 2. Hereafter, Reagan to the U.N.

¹⁴Reagan to Bundestag, p. 6.

¹⁵State of the Union 1982, p. 82.

¹⁶Reagan to Parliament, p. 9.

¹⁷Reagan at Eureka College, p. 602.

¹⁸Reagan to West Berlin, p. 3.

¹⁹Reagan to Parliament, p. 4; "Ronald Reagan to the People of Foreign Nations," filmed for broadcast on January 1, 1982 by the U.S. International Communication Agency, Weekly Compilation, January 11, 1982, p. 2.

²⁰President's statement on the twentieth anniversary of the Berlin Wall, Weekly Compilation, August 17, 1981, p. 877.

²¹President's news conference, Weekly Compilation, February 2, 1981, pp. 66-67.

²²Reagan at Eureka College, p. 600.

²³Interview of Reagan by Jack Nelson, Richard T. Cooper, and George Skelton of the Los Angeles Times, Weekly Compilation, January 25, 1982, p. 64.

²⁴Reagan to Parliament, p. 9; Reagan to Bundestag, p. 3; "To the People of Foreign Nations," Weekly Compilation, January 11, 1982, p. 2. Reagan to Parliament, p. 3; interview with Walter Cronkite, Weekly Compilation,

March 9, 1981, p. 232.

²⁵Eugene F. Miller calls this the "constitutivist view" of political metaphor in his "Metaphor and Political Knowledge," American Political Science Review, 73 (1979), 160-162.

²⁶Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 2nd rev. ed. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 98.

²⁷See Robert L. Ivie, "The Metaphor of Force in Prowar Discourse: The Case of 1812," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68 (1982), 240-253.

²⁸Reagan to the U.N., p. 2.

²⁹Reagan to the U.N., p. 4.

³⁰Paraphrased by Eugene Miller, p. 162.

³¹Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), p. 83.

³²Ernest G. Bormann, "A Fantasy Theme Analysis of the Television Coverage of the Reagan Inaugural and the Hostage Release," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68, (1982), 134; James E. Combs, "A Process Approach," in Handbook of Political Communication, eds. Dan D. Nimmo and Keith R. Sanders, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 61-62; James E. Combs, Dimensions of Political Drama (Santa Monica, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, (1980), ch. 1; and Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, p. 162.

³³The text of the speech is taken from The New York Times, November 23, 1982, p. A12.

³⁴See, for instance, the New York Times, November 23, 1982, p. A13.

³⁵The text of the news conference is taken from The New York Times, January 6, 1983, p. 14.

³⁶New York Times, November 23, 1982, p. A12.

³⁷Ritter, "Ronald Reagan and 'The Speech'," pp. 53-56.

³⁸New York Times, November 23, 1982, p. A12.

³⁹Walter R. Fisher, "Romantic Democracy, Ronald Reagan, and Presidential Heroes," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 46 (Summer 1982), 302, 304, 307.

⁴⁰These are George Kennan's words reported by Richard L. Strout, "Should US and USSR Fear Each Other?" Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 1982, p. 23.